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Comments on Howard S. Levie's Paper:
Submarine Warfare: With Emphasis on the
1936 London Protocol
By
Dieter Fleck *
The 1936 London Protocol in Today's Perspective
Professor Levie's study1 offers an impressive historical review of a development that finally has led to the present state of complex arguments, controversial
opinions and uncertain results. I agree with his statement that for the conduct
of submarine operations such important issues as the arming of merchantmen
and their sailing under military convoy, the use offalse colors, the establishment
of "war zones," the sinking of merchantmen without warning, and failure to
assure the safety of passengers and crews are relevant. 2 While it is certainly true
that only the latter two issues were expressly addressed in the 1936 London
Protocol, a present-day interpretation of this instrument must be based on a
wider spectrum of aspects relevant in this context.
Let me try to formulate a European opinion on the question as to what extent
the 1936 London Protocol is still valid today. This includes the question ofwhich
existing rules should be reaffirmed or further developed in international cooperation. I do not attempt to give definite answers since the topic has rightly been
described as one of the least developed areas of the law of armed conflict.3 I
consider it a pioneer achievement that this subject has been taken up in the NWP
9 - the first time in a modem military manual- and I believe that the comments
and, indeed, also dissenting opinions should be discussed in detail to strengthen
international cooperation.

I. Actions Against Enemy Merchantmen
A systematic evaluation of existing rules for "action with regard to merchant
ships", to use the language of the 1936 London Protocol, has to start with a
definition. What do we mean by "merchant ships"? What are the conditions
under which such ships would loose their status as civilian objects protected
under international law? Merchant ships may only be attacked if they comply
with the definition ofa military objective, i.e. ifby their nature, location, purpose
or use such ships make an effective contribution to military action and their total
or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage. 4
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The key problem posed by this definition is how to define an "effective
contribution to military action" and how such a contribution can be concluded
from the nature, location, purpose or use of the particular object. It has correctly
been argued that "no basis will be found until the whole matter is conscientiously
viewed in the context of the full emergence of the economic arm of warfare,
with the annihilation ofenemy maritime commerce as a major naval objective. ,,5
But legal criteria to be developed for this purpose can hardly be different in land,
sea, and air warfare: The standards are uniform, even if their implementation
poses specific problems in the different theatres.
A list of activities liable to render enemy merchant vessels military objectives
was recently discussed in detail at the Bochum Round Table of Experts,
convened by the International Institute ofHumanitarian Law (San Remo) under
its 1988 Madrid plan of action. 6 The results go far beyond a simple reference to
ships that are armed or are sailing under enemy military convoy. Also, certain
qualifications were formulated that could deserve consideration by all who
implement or interpret existing national bright line rules. The Bochum Round
Table has defined eight categories in which enemy merchant vessels are to be
considered as military objectives:
(1) engaging in acts of war on behalf of the enemy, e.g. laying mines,
minesweeping, cutting undersea cables and pipelines, visiting neutral
merchant ships for the purpose ofsearch, or attacking other merchant ships;
(2) acting as auxiliaries to the enemy's armed forces; e.g. troop carrying or
replenishing warships;
(3) being incorporated into, or assisting the enemy's intelligence system;
(4) sailing under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft;
(5) refusing an order to stop or actively resisting visit, search or capture;
(6) being armed to an extent that they could inflict considerable damage
on a warship (this excludes small arms for the defense of personnel, e.g.
against pirates, and purely deflective systems);
[1) being engaged in the enemy's war-fighting effort, e.g. carrying military
materials; or
(8) being engaged in any other activity bringing them within the definition
of a military objective.
In some aspects these categories are more specific than the NWP 9. The latter
is phrased in general terms as far as military objectives are concerned? It uses a
very similar list of categories to define the circumstances under which enemy
merchant vessels may be attacked and destroyed by surface warships. The authors
suggest that these categories were modifications of the 1936 London Protocol
"in light of current technology, including satellite communications, over-thehorizon weapons, and antiship missile systems, as well as the customary practice
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ofbelligerents that evolved during and following World War 11.8 Is such complex
argumentation necessary? The London Protocol did not establish rules for surface
warships but reaffirmed the applicability of existing rules to submarine warfare.
Such rules did not and do not include a special protection for military objectives.
Merchant ships which fall under one of the eight categories described earlier are
military objectives and cannot, therefore, be expected to be safe against attacks.
Indeed, the London Protocol could not extend to "warshiplike merchantment".9 The prohibition of the effective use of submarines against such ships
was not part of the London Protoco1. 10 Attacks must, however, be confined to
military objectives and they must comply with the principles of proportionality
and necessity.
As far as submarine warfare is concerned, NWP 9 states that the London
Protocol, coupled with the customary practice of belligerents, imposes upon
submarines the responsibility to provide for the safety of passengers, crew, and
ship's papers before destroying an enemy merchant vessel, unless:
(1) the enemy merchant vessel refuses to stop when summoned to do so
or otherwise resists capture;
(2) the enemy merchant vessel is sailing under armed convoy or is itself
armed;
(3) the enemy merchant vessel is assisting in any way the enemy's military
intelligence system or is acting in any capacity as a naval auxiliary to the
enemy's armed forces;
(4) the enemy has integrated its merchant shipping into its war-fighting/war-sustaining effort and compliance with this rule would, under the
circumstances ofthe specific encounter, subject the submarine to imminent
danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment. II
But should attacks on certain merchant ships be made dependent upon a
decision that the enemy has integrated its merchant shipping in general under
its war-fighting or war-sustaining effort? Should such attacks on the other hand
be considered lawful in all situations where they may be deemed necessary for
mission accomplishment? A thorough assessment shows that the definition of
military objectives in the specific situation offers the best possible criterion for
drawing the line between legal and illegal attacks at sea. Mission accomplishment
in my opinion is too vague a notion to allow for clear legal qualifications.
The implementation of the described categories of military objectives is still
difficult enough in practice. Identification of arms may pose problems, even if
we no longer insist on the impossible investigation of whether a certain
armament has been used, or is intended for use, offensively against an enemy. 12
Merchant ships involved in armed conflicts since 1945 have wisely avoided
armament. Effective contribution to military action is a legal term of art which

81 Fleck
requires policy decisions to be taken in practice. Such decisions are dependent
upon the threat imposed and the military advantage anticipated. Armed forces
which adhere to the principle of damage limitation will be rather restrictive in
this respect. In all circumstances the rule of proportionality requires responsible
commanders to abstain from attack when seizure or capture are possible by other
means.

II. Actions Against Merchant Vessels of Non-Belligerents
A slightly different approach for action with regard to vessels of non-belligerents should be considered in this context. It was discussed at the Bochum
Round Table that such vessels may not be attacked unless:
(1) after prior warning, they intentionally and clearly refuse to stop after
being summoned to do so;
(2) after prior warning, they intentionally and clearly resist visit, search or
capture;
(3) they engage in acts of war on behalf of the enemy;
(4) they act as auxiliaries to the enemy's armed forces;
(5) they are incorporated into, or assist, the enemy's intelligence system;
(6) they sail under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft; or
(7) they make an effective contribution to military action (e.g. carrying
military materials) and it is not feasible for the attacking forces to first place
passengers and crew in a place of safety. Unless the circumstances do not
permit they are to be given a warning, so that they can reroute or take
other precautions.
Quite obviously, the decision to attack a merchant vessel flying the flag of a
non-belligerent state could not be based on the simple fact of it being armed.
Action against such ships is based on the principle oflaw enforcement, enforcement of control, rather than self-defense. This requires additional considerations
in balancing the rule of proportionality. It is for this reason that prior warning
is felt essential in case a non-belligerent merchant vessel which refuses to stop
or resists visit, search or capture should be made the object of attack.

III. Special Situation in War Zones
Particular considerations are required for merchantmen sailing in a zone of
restriction. The establishment of danger zones is widely accepted as being within
reasonable limits of the freedom of the high seas. The proclamation of exclusion
zones, however, which implies a sink-on-sight policy, remains controversial.
The purpose of such exclusion zones should be directed to assist in identifying
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hostile targets and putting up a defense against hostile acts rather than to campaign
against the enemy's war economy. All restrictions have to be limited with severe
requirements accordingly, so that the size, location and duration of a maritime
exclusion zone reflect the principles of proportionality and necessity.13
But I have difficulties in sharing Professor Levie's assumption that the
application of the 1936 London Protocol would largely, though not entirely, be
nullified if the establishment of maritime exclusion zones were determined a
legal method of naval warfare. Ifexclusion zones were established in accordance
with the principles I have described, the zone regime may be implemented by
submarines as well as surface warships.

IV. False Flags
Legal experts are relatively silent on the use of deceptions by merchant ships.
But feigning civilian or neutral status may not only serve the purpose offulfilling
a specific military mission but also that ofsimply escaping attack. Merchant ships
have, indeed, often used false flags for better protection. While this is prohibited
under the terms of various national laws, international law is not clear in this
respect.14 There is not only the question of whether or not such feigning is
prohibited, but also, and even more important, the question exists of possible
consequences for the relations between merchant vessels and warships at sea.
The transfer of enemy vessels to a neutral flag is void under the conditions set
up in Articles 55 and 56 of the 1909 London Declaration. Enemy merchant ships
resorting to such practice are in any event subject to lawful capture by belligerent
· 15
warshIpS.
Using false flags may no longer be a desirable practice in naval warfare. At
least the feigning of signals and flags for long distance identification, however,
requires a distinct solution.

V. Prior Warning
The question of prior warning is one element of the rule of proportionality
in the exercise of self-defense. Article 57 (2c) of Protocol I Additional to the
Geneva Conventions reaffirms an existing rule which is applicable also in naval
warfare. 16 It provides that "effective advance warning shall be given of attacks
which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit."
Flexibility in the implementation of this rule remains essential: the offensive use
of weapons can create a danger for enemy submarines. In that case the latter are
entitled to launch appropriate preemptive strikes, including sinking without
•
17
warrung.
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VI. Safety for Passengers and Crew
The 1936 London Protocol reaffinned that merchant ships, "except in the
case ofpersistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance
to visit or search," may not be sunk or rendered incapable of navigation without
the safety of the passengers, crew and ship's papers having first been ensured.
This clearly describes a situation where there is time for consideration and
appropriate action to arrange for safety. The merchant ship must not persistendy
refuse to stop and must not actively resist a visit or search if such protection is
to be claimed. Submarines engaged in such situations are by definition well in
a position to arrange for the safety of passengers and crew since there is no
immediate threat from the latter that excludes such action.
On the other hand the London Protocol does not address the question of
rescuing personnel after the sinking of a ship. IS The search for and rescue of
survivors after each naval engagement is a legal requirement which stems from
the prohibition of unnecessary suffering. Article 18 of the Second Geneva
Convention of 1949 provides that after each engagement parties to the conflict
shall, "without delay take all possible measures to search for and collect the
shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead and prevent their
being despoiled." As Pictet put it in his commentary,19 the obligation to act
without delay is strict; but only measures within the possibilities of the parties
are to be taken, for one cannot lay down an absolute rule that the commander
of a warship must engage in rescue operations if, by so doing he would expose
his vessel to attack. In this regard Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions has added important clarifications to existing conventional law: shipwrecked persons shall continue to be considered shipwrecked during their rescue,
"provided that they continue to refrain from any act ofhostility.,,2o Protection
and care are to be rendered "to the fullest extent practicable. ,,21

Conclusion
Is it true to say that the 1936 London Protocol is oflegal relevance only in a
situation where the submarine can act with minimal risk on the surface, a
situation which is hardly ever likely to occur?22 A careful evaluation of history
and text of this instrument certainly supports the conclusion that it has only
reaffinned rules for situations where minimal risk for submarines was involved.
The rules so interpreted have not been derogated by subsequent state practice
and are still worth maintaining. A continuous reaffinn~tion of these rules is of
political and practical importance. 23
While I support Professor Levie's general statement that the 1936 London
Protocol continues to be valid, I believe one should not draw too quick a
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conclusion by arguing that compliance with its rules can be expected in limited
conflicts only. If this argument held true there would still remain the problem
of how to define the difference between general and limited armed conflicts, for
though even recent wars may have been limited in terms ofparticipation, theatre,
and weapons employed, they have not necessarily been limited from the point
of view of the belligerents.24 The remaining task in my opinion is, therefore,
not only to maintain and properly implement the 1936 London Protocol in all
types of armed conflict, but also to supplement its provisions with rules that
would guarantee both sufficient self-defense against attacks and cooperative
action by the belligerents for the humanitarian protection of civilians and ciV'ilian
objects.
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